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Abstract: Rail infrastructure investment is crucial for improving Australia’s economic productivity and 
competiveness. Consequently, the Federal and State Governments have prioritized the development and 
expansion of urban, non-urban and freight rail networks. However, despite the importance placed on 
delivering cost efficient and effective rail infrastructure, cost overruns are a vexatious issue throughout 
Australia. This paper uses an exploratory case study approach to analyze the cost overruns of a homogenous 
dataset comprising of 16 rail projects delivered by a ‘single’ contractor, which accounted for more than 
AU$ ½ billion of work for several incumbent Australian State Governments and asset owners between 2011 
and 2014. In stark contrast to the planning and transport literature, the cost overrun was determined from 
the contract award for construction. As a result, a mean cost overrun of 23% was observed with scope 
changes accounting for 99% of the cost increase. Ten projects were delivered using a ‘Traditional Lump 
Sum’ procurement method; of note, two of these projects experienced cost underruns, with the remaining 
50% incurring a mean cost overrun of 12.83%. The empirical distribution of the sample that experienced 
cost overruns were computed and the ‘best fit’ probability density function was determined and found to 
be a Frechet 3P. The derivation of probabilities provides decision-makers with a reliable basis to determine 
an appropriate construction contingency based upon empirical data rather a deterministic percentage. The 
research recommends that: 1) risk and forecast cost contingencies should be accurately assessed during; 
and 2), greater utilization of collaborative forms of procurement (juxtaposed with the use of building 
information modelling (BIM) and systems information modelling (SIM)) will provide the public sector and 
asset owners greater confidence that delivering and maintaining rail network projects can be delivered cost 
effectively. The research presented provides much needed clarity to further explain the nature of cost 
overruns and affords guidance on how their occurrence can be mitigated using process and technological 
innovation. 
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Introduction 
Rail infrastructure investment is crucial for improving Australia’s economic productivity and 
competiveness. Consequently, the Federal and State Governments have prioritized the 
development and expansion of its urban, non-urban and freight rail networks (Infrastructure 
Australia, 2016). This infrastructural development may encompass the construction of new stations 
and tracks, extensions to existing lines, electrification of suburban networks, amplification and 
line upgrades and maintenance. The existing rail infrastructure must be maintained to optimum 
and exacting quality standards whilst, upgrades and new projects must be completed on time and 
to schedule to mitigate any adverse impact upon businesses and commuters. Yet, rail projects in 
Australia continue to experience significant cost overruns and delays, particularly urban rail 
projects (i.e. in excess of AU$1 billion) such as the Gold Coast light rail, Moreton bay rail link, 
Sydney light rail and the Perth-Mandurah rail line.  
 
Evidence indicates that cost overruns incurred on rail infrastructure projects is a worldwide 
phenomenon (e.g., Leavitt et al., 1993; Flyvbjerg et al., 2007; Canteralli et al., 2012a,b,c). For 
example, in the United Kingdom (UK) the Edinburgh Tram System experienced a cost overrun in 
excess of 100%. Whilst in the United States (US), several high profile rail projects have 
experienced significant overruns (Grabauskas, 2015), namely: the US$1.8 billion central link light-
rail project in Seattle was 38% over budget; Phoenix’s US$1.07 billion East Valley light-rail 
project was 31% budget; San Francisco’s US$1.2 billion airport heavy-rail project, 30% over 
budget; and Los Angeles’ US$3 billion heavy-rail red line project, 47% over budget. These cases 
reiterate a perpetual story for taxpayers; shortfalls result in increased debt and increased taxes, 
which can often stem generations to repay the borrowed monies of government. This situation is 
exemplified in the Honolulu rail transit project that commenced in 2008 – the project was expected 
to cost US$4 billion to construct (Mangieri, 2016) and is expected to exceed US$10 billion upon 
completion (Daysog, 2016). 
 
Major causes of cost increases on the Honolulu rail transit project are the limited supply of labor 
and the increasing cost of materials (Shimogawa, 2016). When preparing the project budget, 
forecasting the supply and demand of labor and materials is an arduous, and in some instances, 
impossible task to determine, especially when estimators have to forecast construction costs 
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months or even years in advance; in this instance ‘uncertainty’ prevails and ‘guesstimating’ occurs 
(Sing et al., 2012; Sing et al., 2016). For example, the Sydney light rail project and Edinburgh 
Tram System, under estimation of the cost of moving utilities such as power cables significantly 
contributed to increased construction costs (Saulwick, 2014). Importantly, ‘as-built’ 
documentation for power cables seldom exist or are often inaccurate (Love et al., 2016a). 
Individual cities are characteristically unique (i.e. in terms of their layout and structures), hence, it 
is unrealistic to assume that an accurate forecast of the underground utilities that may be required 
to be re-located could be undertaken. A ‘provisional sum’ (i.e. an allowance for undefined work) 
is typically provided when this situation arises (Smith et al., 2016). For urban rail mega-projects, 
estimators must often determine an initial budget for construction costs, months, years or even 
decades in advance. Thus, a design contingency (i.e. allocated for changes during design for factors 
such as incomplete scope definition and estimating inaccuracy) is required and subsequently 
reduced as more information becomes available. Prior to the commencement of construction, a 
contingency (i.e. where any unresolved design issues at the time of contract award are incorporated 
into the estimate/contract price) is also needed, though this often calculated deterministically rather 
using a probabilistic approach (Love et al., 2015a; Love et al., 2016b).  
 
Research undertaken by Flyvbjerg (2007) and Canteralli et al. (2012c),  provided an initial 
platform for understanding cost overruns in rail projects, particularly those classified as being 
‘mega’ in size and complexity. Issues surrounding strategic misrepresentation, optimum bias and 
political machinations abounding have been over-emphasized in the planning and transport 
literature (e.g., Siemiatycki, 2009), with much of the research propagated being incorporeal (e.g., 
Love et al., 2012a; Osland and Strand 2015). Despite insufficient evidence presented by Flyvbjerg 
(2007), the research (ibid) has attracted media attention and opposition political parties, and has 
undoubtedly served as reference point from which to comprehend why mega rail projects 
experience cost overruns. Rather than focusing on ‘mega’ projects, this paper examines  overruns 
cost for rail projects commissioned by several incumbent Australian State Governments and asset 
owners to improve the productivity and performance of their region and businesses operating 
within it. A case study approach is used to analyze overrun costs of a homogenous sample of rail 
projects delivered by a ‘single’ contractor between 2011 and 2014. The research presented 
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provides a much needed clarity to further explain the nature of cost overruns and affords guidance 
on how their occurrence can be mitigated using process and technological innovation. 
 
 
Cost Overruns and Rail Projects  
While the extant literature is replete with studies that have examined cost overruns in 
transportation infrastructure projects (e.g. Bordat et al. 2004; Odeck, 2004; Vidalis and Najafi, 
2004; Liu et al., 2010; Canteralli et al., 2012a,b,c; Love et al., 2015a; Odeck et al., 2015; Verweji 
et al., 2016a), the number of studies that have focused on rail projects is limited (e.g., Pickrell, 
1990; Fourace et al., 1990; Leavitt et al., 1993; Dantata et al., 2006; Flyvbjerg et al., 2007). 
Moreover, the sample size of projects  examined has been small, ranging from as low as 10 
(Pickrell) to a maximum of 169 (Canteralli et al., 2012c). According to Flyvbjerg (2007) rail tends 
to experience the largest cost overrun of all the types of transportation projects with a mean of 
44.7%. 
 
The reported mean cost overrun however, differs significantly between studies in various 
countries; for example, 50% in the US (Pickrell, 1990), 10.6% in the Netherlands (Canteralli et 
al., 2012c) and 17% in Sweden (Lundberg et al., 2011). A primary reason for this observed 
disparity is the ‘point of reference’ from where the cost overrun is measured (Love et al., 2015a; 
Love et al., 2016a). Within the planning and transport fraternity, cost overruns are the difference 
between initial forecasted budget and actual construction costs (Canteralli et al., 2012a). Between 
the initial forecasted budget of construction costs and the commencement of construction, several 
estimates will be prepared and refined before being lodged for approval. Odeck (2004)  however, 
suggested that the reference point for a cost overrun should be at the detailed planning stage where 
design, specification and final cost are determined. Similarly, Love et al. (2015a) advocated that 
cost overruns should be determined at the point of contract signature to undertake construction. At 
this juncture, a degree of cost certainty can be provided to an asset owner subject to the 
procurement method adopted and completeness of tender documentation provided to the party/ 
parties (i.e. contractor/consortium/joint venture) contracted to perform the required works.  
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A significant omission by Flyvbjerg (2007) and Canteralli et al. (2012a,b,c) is that they have not 
acknowledged the influence that a procurement method and contract can have on a project’s costs. 
For example, if a rail project is delivered as an alliance contract, then the consortium can be 
‘locked-in’ by the contract to provide a Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP) based on an initial 
budget estimate. Using procurement methods of this ilk, transfers ‘design’ and ‘construction’ risks 
to a single entity. In addition, if a Public-Private Partnership or variant thereof such as Design 
Build Operate and Maintain is used, then at what point is a cost overrun determined? At the 
conclusion of construction or when the asset is handed over back to the government when the 
operations and maintenance (O&M) phase has been completed (Liu et al., 2016). Essentially, the 
‘bundling’ up of capital and operating costs have been largely ignored in the planning and transport 
literature. 
 
A comprehensive review of factors influencing the variability between an initial forecasted budget 
and final tender sum has been provided in Adafin et al. (2016a,b) and includes: changes in 
owner/stakeholder requirements, planning requirements or restrictions, market conditions (e.g., 
fluctuations in labor prices), poorly prepared documentation, availability of design information 
and government legislation/policy. Issues, however, that have been eschewed by Adafin et al. 
(2016a) are optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation that may be used to influence the budget 
estimate and its subsequent management during the design development process. As noted above, 
to determine how the aforementioned issues influence the costs up to the point where a contract is 
signed prior to the commencement of construction is highly subjective.  
 
Irrespective of the point that is used to determine the percentage cost overrun experienced, there 
is broad consensus that rail projects globally are typically confronted by unnecessary expenditure 
increases. In Australia, State Governments and their transport infrastructure delivery agencies have 
been criticized in the media (e.g. Moore 2016), by lobby groups (e.g., Eco-Transit, 2015) and State 
Auditors (e.g., NSW Audit Office 2010; VAGO, 2010) over the escalating cost of rail projects. 
According to Martin (2011) State Governments need to acquire improved knowledge about project 
costs for their rail projects so as to develop more robust and reliable business cases. An analysis 
of 26 major public rail projects delivered in Australia between 2000 and 2009 (Martin, 2011) 
revealed significant differences in construct costs per km: for example, the 12 kilometer (km) 
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Epping Chatswood Railway line in Sydney (heavy suburban line) was the most expensive at 
AU$193.36 million per km, whereas the 72km Perth-Mandurah Line (heavy suburban line) was a 
fraction of the cost, at a mere AU$17.36 million per km. The cost difference between these two 
projects,  has engendered a perception that rail costs are higher than they should be in cities such 
as Sydney and Melbourne (Gatenby, 2009; Martin, 2011).  
 
Research Approach 
The research undertaken by Flyvbjerg (2007) and Canteralli et al. (2012a,b,c) relied upon ‘black-
box’ international database that afforded limited information about how their data was collated 
and why there was a reliance upon secondary sources. More specifically, the reliability of data 
presented in Canteralli et al. (2012c) is questionable because they state “if the actual costs are 
unknown at the time of project completion, the most reliable later figure for actual costs is used 
(i.e. from a year later than the opening) if available. If unavailable, an earlier figure for actual costs 
could be used (i.e. from a year before the opening year), but only if 90% of the budget was spent 
at this time i.e. the project was 90% complete in financial” (p.326). The authors (Canteralli et al. 
2012c) fail to adequately elucidate upon why and how was 90% determined in this instance and 
what percentage of projects were deemed 90% complete . In addition, they make a comparison 
with Flyvbjerg et al.’s (2002) original dataset of 258 projects, which was collected from projects 
completed in different time points and from an array of countries; construction techniques, 
technologies, legal jurisdictions, political and economic environments, client types and 
procurement arrangements all differed, yet these limitations were overlooked (Love et al., 2015a).  
 
This paper seeks to ameliorate understanding about cost overruns in rail projects and used an 
exploratory case study approach to obtain primary cost data from a homogenous data source from 
a contractor with extensive experience of undertaking these projects (Shields and Rangarjan, 
2013). . The contractor had previously collaborated with the research team with on other studies 
and was willing to disclose contract information on rail projects that had been constructed between 
2011 and 2014. Projects that had commenced in 2015 and progressing in 2016 were excluded from 
the research. Due to the commercial sensitivity of the data provided, only a brief description of 
each project is provided. Table 1 provides information about the types of project, the procurement 
methods used, the classification, location, original contract value, the cost change and the amount 
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of scope changes that were incurred. While asset owners sanctioning the identified projects were 
different, the contractor’s processes (e.g., quality assurance systems, safety management and 
contract administrative procedures), technologies, and construction methods were standardized. In 
addition, the procurement methods used are also very similar, though this is often reflective of the 
business case that is established, the risk and complexity of the projects and prevailing economic 
conditions (Love et al., 2012b). 
 
Analysis  
Descriptive statistics such as the mean (M), standard deviation (SD), and inter-quartile were 
calculated for the 16 rail projects constructed by the contracting organization. A Probability 
Density Function (PDF) was computed for a continuous distribution so that the likelihood for rail 
projects experiencing a cost overrun to be undertaken. The probability that is obtained can establish 
a construction contingency that is useful for public and private sector asset owners and contractors. 
Scope changes consume additional resources (e.g., labor, materials, and equipment) and can 
adversely impact schedule, a contractor must be proactive and ‘anticipate what might go wrong’ 
by employing mechanisms to ensure a project meets its expected deliverables. 
 
The PDF for a continuous distribution can be expressed in terms of an integral between two points: 
 
𝑃 = ∫ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑏
𝑎
    𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏         [Eq. 1] 
A cumulative distribution functions (CDF) was also produced. For theoretical continuous 
distributions the CDF is expressed as a curve and denoted by: 
 
         [Eq.2] 
 
The empirical CDF, which is displayed as a stepped discontinuous line and dependent on the 
number of bins, is represented by: 
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[Number of observations ]       [Eq.3] 
 
The PDF, Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDF) and distribution parameters 
( ) for continuous distributions such as Beta, Burr, Cauchy, Error, Gumbel 
Max/Min, Johnson SB, Normal, and Wakeby were examined using the estimation method 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates. The ‘best fit’ distribution was then determined using the 
following ‘Goodness of Fit’ tests, which measure the compatibility of a random sample with a 
theoretical probability distribution:  
 
 Anderson-Darling statistic (A2): A general test to compare the fit of an observed CDF to an 
expected CDF. The test provides more weight to a distributions tails than the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test. The Anderson-Darling statistic is defined as: 
 
    [Eq.4] 
 
 Chi-squared statistic (χ2): Determines if a sample comes from a population with a specific 
distribution. The Chi-squared statistic is defined as: 
 
          [Eq.5] 
 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (D): Based on the largest vertical difference between the 
theoretical and empirical CDF: 
 
      [Eq.6] 
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where Oi is the observed frequency for bin i, and Ei is the expected frequency of bin i calculated 
by: 
  
         [Eq.7] 
 
Here F is the CDF of the probability distribution being tested, and x1, x2 the limits for the bin 
i.  
 
The above ‘Goodness of Fit’ tests were used to test the null (Ho) and alternative hypotheses (H1) 
of the datasets: H0 - follow the specified distribution; and H1 - do not follow the specified 
distribution. The hypothesis regarding the distributional form is rejected at the chosen significance 
level (α) if the statistic D, A2, χ2 is greater than the critical value. For the purposes of this research, 
a 0.05 significance level was used to evaluate the null hypothesis.  
 
The p-value, in contrast to fixed α values is calculated based on the test statistic and denotes the 
threshold value of significance level in the sense that Ho will be accepted for all values of α less 
than the p-value. Once the ‘best fit’ distribution was identified, the probabilities for a cost change 
were calculated using the CDF. Then, to simulate the samples randomness and derive the 
probabilities of a cost overrun (e.g., scope changes in this case) arising during construction, a 
Mersenne Twister, which is pseudorandom number generating algorithm, was used to generate a 
sequence of numbers that approximated the sample to 5000 (Matsumoto and Nishimura, 1998). 
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Results 
The total value of rail projects that had been originally awarded to the contractor during 2011 and 
2014 was AU$539,569,997, with an M = AU$33,723,124 and SD = AU$78,398,023 (Table 1). 
The total value of work that was undertaken was AU$665,479,369, an increase of 19%. This 
additional increase was predominately due to client initiated scope changes. Two rail projects 
incurred cost increases other than the scope changes that were approved by their clients, namely 
an ‘Urban Track Upgrade’ and the ‘Installation and Maintenance of Concrete Sleepers’, which 
experienced non-conformances accounting for AU$397,978 and AU$115,560, respectively. 
Noteworthy, two projects experienced a cost underrun due to changes in scope. Table 1 reveals 
that a variety of rail projects were undertaken such as ‘New Build’ (50%) and a combination of 
‘New Build and Upgrades’ (25%) with most being constructed in Western Australia (WA) (63%). 
 
A total of 10 (63%) rails projects were procured using a ‘Traditional Lump Sum’ method, with 3 
(19%) by ‘Traditional Cost-plus’, 2 (13%) by ‘Design and Construct’ and 1 (6%) using an Alliance 
contract. The three projects that used a ‘Traditional Cost-plus’ were for a private sector client. The 
‘Alliance’ project, which was the largest rail project undertaken by the contractor, was undertaken 
in Victoria and formed part of one of Australia’s largest public infrastructure projects. The 
Victorian State Government used an ‘Alliance’ contract because the capital costs for this high risk 
complex project exceed AU$50 million. The works included new tracks to be laid, the construction 
of new rail overpasses, modifications to existing bridges, extensive track reconfiguration and the 
upgrading of signaling systems.  
 
The mean cost overrun from the contract award for the 16 sampled projects was 23% (Table 2). 
Interestingly, two were delivered using a ‘Traditional Lump’ method (13%) experienced cost 
underruns, with the remaining 50% incurring a mean cost overrun of 12.83%.  The maximum cost 
overrun was 96.73% and the minimum was -4.19%. If the initial budget estimate (also referred as 
the ‘Time of formal decision to build (ToD))’ (Canteralli et al., 2012c) had been used as the point 
of reference to determine the cost overrun, then there is no doubt that the figures presented would 
be significantly inflated.  For the ‘Iron Ore’ project, which incurred a cost overrun of 96.73%, the 
original scope of works was AU$1,200,000 and increased to AU$36,691,000. The contractor, was 
initially required to undertake site preparation works, but as the mine owner was under pressure to 
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commence operations and ship its iron ore to market, new works were added to the existing cost-
plus contract (i.e. the contractor was paid for their expenses, which were to a set limit plus an 
additional payment for profit), which was in place instead of approaching creating a new one. If a 
new contract had been created then a cost overrun would not have been registered.  
 
Distribution Fitting: Probability of Cost Change 
The ‘best fit’ probability distribution was determined using the following ‘Goodness of Fit’ tests: 
Anderson-Darling, Chi-squared statistic and Kolmogorov-Smirnov. The results of the ‘Goodness 
of Fit’ tests revealed that Three Parameter (3P) Frechet distribution provided the best fit for the 
dataset (Table 3).  
 
< Insert Table 3. Goodness of Fit Tests for rail projects > 
 
A Frechet is a form of generalized extreme value distribution (GEV) that is used as an 
approximation to model the maxima of long (finite) sequences of random variables (Coles, 2001).  
The PDF is expressed as: 
 
       [Eq.8] 
 
The CDF is expressed as: 
 
        [Eq.9] 
 
𝛼 is a continuous shape parameter with 𝛼 > 0. 𝛽 > 0 and 𝛾 is a continuous location parameter 
where 𝛾 ≡ 0  yields the two parameter-Frechet distribution. The domain for the 3P Frechet 
distribution is 𝛾 < 𝑥 < +∞. 
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The parameters for the Frechet (3P) were found to be α = 2.496, β = 31.459 and γ = -22.568. 
Figures 2 and 3 present the PDF and CDF based upon the calculated distribution parameters. The 
calculated probabilities of a cost overrun being experienced are presented in Table 4. The 
probability of experiencing a cost change of >10% is 32%. Delimiters have also been used to 
provide probabilities of cost changes within ranges. The probability of a project experiencing 
between a 15% and 25% cost change, for example, is 17% (Figure 4). For a mean cost overrun of 
23% to be experienced the likelihood of occurrence is 60% (P (x < x1) = .67) from contract award. 
Explicitly, the construction cost contingency for 14 of the sampled projects was unable to 
accommodate the scope changes that were needed for them to serve their intended purpose.  At 
contract award, Buertey et al. (2013) have suggested using a contingency value of 3% to 5% of a 
project’s contract value is required to accommodate unresolved design issues.   
 
Discussion 
Delivering rail projects within their forecasted construction cost is a priority for public and private 
sector organizations. The analysis demonstrates the likelihood of rail projects exceeding a 20% 
overrun is high considering current practices. In an attempt to ensure cost certainty in rail projects, 
procurement methods such as ‘Traditional Lump Sum’, ‘Design and Construct’ and ‘Alliances’ 
are often employed. In the case of a ‘Traditional Lump Sum’ method the public sector accepts that 
design work will generally be separate from construction. Consultants are appointed for design 
and cost control, and the contractor is responsible for carrying out the works for a fixed sum. This 
responsibility extends to all workmanship and materials, and includes all work by subcontractors 
and suppliers. The  contractor  is  usually  appointed  by  competitive  tendering  on  complete  
information but  may if necessary be appointed earlier by negotiation on the basis of partial or 
notional information. The contractor undertakes to carry out a defined amount of work in return 
for an agreed sum.  
 
According to Love et al. (2012b) the concept of cost certainty is a fallacy when using traditional 
methods that are based upon full drawings and bills of quantities (BoQ). In principle this approach 
should provide a firm, fixed price for construction, but in practice very few projects are actually 
completed within their tendered price (Rowlinson, 1999); this was clearly evident in the rail 
projects examined. Complete drawings and BoQs are generally unavailable to contractors when a 
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project goes to tender and documentation that is provided often contains errors and omissions, 
which may initiate scope changes and rework during construction (Love et al., 2012a).  
 
With ‘Design and Construct’ methods a contractor accepts responsibility for some or all of the 
design. Design  and  construct  methods  offer  certainty  on  the  contract  sum with the provision 
of a GMP  and  bring  cost  benefits. The  close  integration  of  design  and  construction  methods  
and  the  relative freedom  of  the  contractor to use their purchasing power and market knowledge 
most effectively affords public and private sector clients with a competitive price. However, 
changes in scope can be costly. Considering the inherent degree of cost certainty that this form of 
procurement method provides it was surprising to find that costs had increased. However, both 
projects in question were constructed in an urban environment; a close examination of the scope 
changes revealed that additional work was required to relocate underground utilities. Similarly, 
the scope changes approved by the public authority generally related to unexpected signaling 
issues and integrating newly installed communication systems with an existing mainline station 
power distribution network.  
 
It has been widely acknowledged that collaborative procurement methods such as ‘Alliances’ and 
‘Design and Construct’ and ‘PPPs’ provide improved cost performance and value-for-money for 
the public sector (e.g. Muriro and Wood, 2010). In fact, PPPs consistently demonstrate superior 
cost efficiency over traditional methods ranging from 30.8% (from project inception) to 11.4% 
(from contractual commitment to final outcome) (Infrastructure Partnerships Australia, 2008). 
Despite these reported cost benefits, PPPs have also received widespread criticism, particularly 
with dealing with risk transfers over an assets life (e.g. Hodge, 2004). The Latham (1994) and 
Egan Reports published in the UK (1998) served as a catalyst for reforming the construction 
industry so that project performance would improve. Yet, 20 years later, the level of cost overruns 
occurring has not diminished; a conclusion also propagated by Flyvbjerg et al.(2003). Cost 
overruns,  will remain a pervasive problem unless fundamental changes are made to the 
governance and procurement of projects (e.g., collaborative relationship contracting, and 
bundling), and technological innovations are embraced. Radical reform is needed to improve the 
cost performance and management of information throughout the assets life (Love et al., 2015a).  
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Improving Cost Estimation 
Following strategic justification, which examines what is required to meet client demands and 
needs, an initial budget estimate is prepared. Typically, the initial estimate increases as the project 
progresses through the design development process. Constantly revising and amending the initial 
budget is disruptive and may have concomitant shortfalls in funding occurring (Department of 
Transport and Main Roads, 2015). The performance of an initial budget estimate can only be 
assessed when a project is completed, hence sufficient design contingency must be included to 
accommodate changes in project scope. During this stage, those responsible for preparing the 
initial budget estimate may succumb to optimism bias.  
 
To ensure the reliability of the initial budget estimate and contingency, external professionals’ 
advice and evaluation, particularly cost consultants (e.g., quantity surveyors), should be sought.  
In-line with contemporary procurement thinking (e.g., Loosemore, 2016), a paradigm shift-away 
from traditional to relational methods is needed which involves contractors in vetting initial 
budgets. Indeed, this controversial idea challenges questions associated with probity. Nevertheless, 
the aim here would be to remove ‘uncertainties’ and identify potential risks that may materialize; 
the inclusion of a contractor’s early input in the design process would improve a project’s 
constructability and provide a platform engendering collaboration between parties. When 
contractors assess the initial budget they could also identify innovative alternative methods of 
construction; any advice provided would be fee-based and issues associated with intellectual 
property would require resolution, if they were not awarded a contract to deliver the works. As a 
project moves through its various development stages key decision-makers and policy advisors 
would sign-off and approve the evolving estimate.  
 
At the initial budget stage, a contingency of 30% to 50% should be allowed for incomplete scope 
and 5% to 10% for estimating inaccuracies (Clark and Lorenzoni, 1985). Therefore, as a rule of 
thumb, a 35% to 60% design contingency should be added to the initial budget estimate figure. 
For example, the Department of Transport and Main Roads (2015), expect that initial budget 
estimates have a 90% confidence factor (P90) of not being exceeded at completion. Producing an 
estimate with such a high confidence factor is dependent upon having access to good quality 
information (e.g., costs from previous projects, specific requirements of stakeholders, procurement 
 
 
16 
 
options, and market conditions). A series of cost scenarios that can materialize in projects are 
presented in Figures 5 to 7. The ideal scenario is one where the budget estimate that is established 
excluding the contingency equals the final cost. This is an unlikely scenario considering the 
existing practices and processes that are used to design and construction rail projects and, the 
limited understanding of the systemicity and interdependency of risk (Love et al., 2016a).  
< Figure 5. The ideal cost scenario > 
 
< Insert Figure 6. An acceptable cost scenario > 
 
< Insert Figure 7. Unacceptable cost scenario > 
 
In the projects sampled, an unusually high proportion of cost overruns were due to scope changes. 
The nature of these changes could not be quantified but considering previous empirical research 
undertaken, they were likely to be attributable to client initiated design changes, errors or 
omissions contained within the design documentation (Love et al., 2004). For the rail projects 
presented in this research, the probability of scope change is established based on existing practices 
to document and management information, which was undertaken using Computer-Aided-Design 
(CAD) by independent specific disciplines. 
 
Improving Information Quality 
Figure 7 illustrates an unacceptable cost scenario which may well have arisen within projects 
procured via ‘Cost-plus’ methods. In such situations there is an overwhelming precedence to 
ensure that the rail asset operates expediently which can inadvertently result in a poorly defined 
scope. To reduce scope changes, and improve the quality of decision support information (required 
throughout a rail assets life, particularly during design and construction), technological and process 
innovations such as Building Information Modelling (BIM) (Figure 8) and Systems Information 
Modelling (SIM) (Figure 9) should be implemented simultaneously (Love et al., 2016c). 
 
The US National Building Information Model Standard Project Committee (2015) defined BIM as 
“a digital representation of physical and functional characteristics of a facility. A BIM is a shared 
knowledge resource for information about a facility forming a reliable basis for decisions during 
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its life-cycle, which is defined as existing from earliest conception to demolition”.  A SIM, 
however, is a derivative of BIM, but represents a process of modeling complex connected systems, 
such as electrical control, power and communications (herein after electrical systems), which do 
not possess geometry (Love et al., 2016b). Essentially, a SIM takes a discipline specific perspective 
but can be integrated within a BIM when a single point of truth is formed.  
 
When a SIM is applied to engineer and document a system, all the physical equipment and 
associated connections, similarly to constructing a BIM, are modeled in a relational database with 
each component modeled only once resulting in a 1:1 relationship between the SIM and the real 
world. However, when using traditional CAD (as preferred method to document the design of 
electrical systems within the rail sector), each object in the real world may appear on multiple 
drawings and each drawing may contain a number of objects. Thus, an n:n relationship (i.e., n 
number of objects appear on n number of drawings) is formed between the real-world objects and 
the drawings. Hence, the propensity for errors and omissions to materialize significantly increases 
as changes to individual CAD drawings that contain the same object need to be undertaken and 
up-dated manually. 
 
< Insert Figure 8. Extracts from a Building Information Model from a rail project> 
 
< Insert Figure 9. Creation of a retrospective Systems Information Model from a rail project > 
 
When BIM is used to establish an initial budget estimate, its visualization capacity can explore 
design solutions and conduct preliminary construction programming, life-cycle costing, functional 
analysis and cost benchmarking. From the on-set, stakeholders can visualize the rail asset and 
make critiques and modifications while instantaneously being able to determine the impact on the 
project’s cost. As the design and engineering mature, costs can be monitored and alternative 
options analyzed. With the early involvement of a contractor, the potential of optimism bias 
significantly diminishes, as ‘checks and balances’, as well as costs that reflect actual market prices 
can be considered and brought to the fore.  
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Early contractor involvement may not always be feasible and practical, and will invariably depend 
upon the project’s value (Rahman and Alhassan, 2012). However, this does not discount the 
influence that the independent design team can exert in using BIM to ensure the constructability 
and cost effectiveness of various options that may be put forward for consideration. As noted in 
Figure 8, during the rail of a tunnel its alignment can be modelled juxtaposed with Geographical 
Information Systems, track schedule progress can be tracked and visualized (4D), and cost and 
schedule progress of stations can be simultaneously visualized (5D).  
 
Working within a BIM environment will significantly reduce scope changes and provide greater 
cost certainty, particularly during construction (Hartman et al., 2012). It is therefore anticipated 
that when BIM is applied to rail projects, the probability of cost overruns being incurred will 
dramatically change. To achieve the real benefits of a BIM solution requires collaboration between 
all parties who are selected to deliver a rail asset, particularly when there is a requirement for 
ensure a BIM is required to minimize costs during O&M. London’s ₤14.8 billion Crossrail network 
project exploits BIM to help planners integrate the new train lines into existing infrastructure 
(Peplow, 2016). According to Peplow (2016), the use of BIM has saved time and money by 
reducing construction errors, which often manifest as additional scope changes or rework costs. 
The use of clash detection, laser scanning, compliance checking, sensors to check and monitor the 
integrity of the rail network, have all contributed to ensure mitigating scope changes and rework 
in Crossrail, and have assured assets integrity for O&M.   
 
Rail projects are dependent on electrical systems to function. Like BIM, a SIM can  establish the 
initial budget estimate for such systems and provide approximate quantities as cable lengths, 
connectors and devices when the route for the project has been established. Empirical research has 
demonstrated that the use of a SIM during design can provide as much as a 90% reduction in the 
amount time and cost to prepare documentation (Love et al., 2013). In addition, a SIM significantly 
reduces the proclivity for errors and omissions to be made as well as information redundancy in 
documentation thereby minimizing scope changes during construction.   
 
Provide information in a format that does not possess ‘noise’ is an essential ingredient in 
developing an initial budget estimate for electrical systems. Rail projects often require up-grades 
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to tracks and maintenance and estimating the cost of such projects requires an understanding of 
not only the new work to be undertaken but also the existing network. Using 3D laser scanning hi-
resolution imagery from linear and real world positions, the existing network can be integrated 
with the new design and costed appropriately (Figure 8).  
 
Limitations 
Akin to the research conducted by Flyvbjerg (2007) and Canteralli et al. (2012c), this research 
presented has limitations. The most notable is the sample size, which was limited to 16, although 
a Mersenne Twister, was used to generate a sequence of pseudorandom numbers that approximated 
the sample to 5000. The data, however, is homogenous, reliable and is reflective of ‘actual’ costs 
that were incurred. While the projects were diverse in their geographical location, they are not 
representative of Australia; absent territories included the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), 
Northern Territory (NT), Queensland (QLD) and Tasmania. This is important considering that 
New South Wales and Victoria have been identified as experiencing higher construction costs for 
rail than other States and Territories.  
 
Unfortunately, the findings could not be compared with Flyvbjerg (2007) and Canteralli et al. 
(2012c) as procurement methods, construction costs, scope changes incurred, and economic 
conditions were not presented. In addition, Flyvbjerg (2007) focused upon ‘mega’ projects, which 
are unique when likened to the general works programs undertaken by State Governments and 
asset owners and therefore, the results presented in this paper are not able to be compared. The 
economic climate within which projects were undertaken between 2011 and 2014 was significantly 
different between Australia States and the ACT and when Flyvbjerg (2007) and Canteralli et al. 
(2012c) conducted their studies. For example, WA (also NT and QLD, though projects were 
constructed by the contractor from 2011 to 2014) was experiencing an economic boom and 
significant increases in population growth due a to demand for energy mineral resources, while 
other States and the ACT were experiencing significantly reduced levels economic activity.  
 
Conclusions 
The cost performance of rail infrastructure projects has received considerable attention as they are 
seldom delivered within budget, particularly those classified as being ‘mega’ projects. 
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Consequently, research has focused upon projects of this magnitude and provide explanations as 
to ‘why’ and ‘how’ cost increases arise. The justifications put forward while plausible are divorced 
from actual data presented, even the solutions for improving the accuracy of budget estimates do 
not reflect the complexity, systemicity and interdependency of risk that can arise during the 
delivery of rail projects.  
 
Recognizing these shortcomings, this paper examines the cost performance of a homogenous 
sample of 16 rail projects that were constructed by a single contractor. Cost performance for the 
rail projects was calculated from the contract award until final completion; this is in stark contrast 
to the extant planning and transport literature that has predominantly focused on using the initial 
budget estimate or the decision to build is made as reference point for cost performance 
determination. Consequently, the determination of cost performance from contract award provides 
a realistic measure, as scope changes as information becomes available during the design process. 
The analysis revealed that a mean cost overrun of 23% of the contract value, with 99% of the total 
cost increase incurred being due to scope changes. Considering prevailing practice, the probability 
of cost overruns arising were determined so that adequate contingency could be established in the 
future. It appears, however, that the historic magnitude of cost increases being experienced in rail 
projects have not decreased in the fifty years or more.  
 
In addressing this problem, a paradigm shift in the way that the initial budget estimate and its 
development must be undertaken by the public sector and asset owners. Such change should 
include: 
   
 the determination of contingencies based upon probabilistic methods such as distribution 
fitting identified and demonstrated in this research, particularly for construction; 
 the greater use of collaborative procurement methods such as Alliances, which includes 
financial incentives to ensure guaranteed maximum prices; 
 third party audit of the initial budget by external consultants to minimize the potential for 
optimism bias; 
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 involvement of contractors, particularly those specializing in electrical systems early in the 
design process to provide constructability advice with particular emphasis being placed on 
the evaluation of initial budget estimate; and 
 the use of BIM and SIM, which can be used to mitigate scope changes.  
 
The cost overrun phenomena is a complex and challenging problem to address. This paper does 
not attempt to provide complete answers but rather serves to suggest a novel way forward in 
dealing with this issue. There is a need, however, to better assess risk and forecast cost 
contingencies, but the use of collaborative forms of procurement juxtaposed with the use of BIM 
and SIM will provide public sector and asset owners (charged with delivering and maintaining rail 
networks) greater confidence that projects can be delivered cost effectively. 
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Table 1. Cost information for rails projects constructed between 2011 and 2014 by geographical region (n=16) 
 
Project Type 
 
Procurement 
Method 
Classification 
 
State 
Original Contract 
Value ($) 
Final Contract 
Value ($) 
Cost 
Difference 
% Cost 
Change 
Scope 
Changes ($)  
Installation and Maintenance of 
Concrete Sleepers 
Traditional 
Lump Sum 
Up-grade and 
Maintenance 
Western 
Australia 
12,905,657 12,386,515 -519,141 -4.19 -403,581 
Track Extension and Installation of a 
Crossing 
Traditional 
Lump Sum 
New Build 
Western 
Australia 
3,480,286 3,418,423 -61,863 -1.81 -61,863 
Modification and Upgrade of Track 
Traditional 
Lump Sum 
New Build and 
Up-grade 
Western 
Australia 
5,404,773 6,382,221 977,448 15.32 977,448 
Iron Ore Track Extension (Spur Line) 
Traditional 
Lump Sum 
New Build 
Western 
Australia 
3,293,777 3,715,808 422,030 11.36 422,030 
Track Maintenance  
 
Traditional 
Lump Sum 
Maintenance 
New South 
Wales 
15,816,417 17,040,378 1,223,961 7.18 1,223,961 
Track Inspection and Maintenance 
Depot 
Traditional 
Lump Sum 
New Build 
New South 
Wales 
2,687,086 3,585,429 898,343 25.05 898,343 
New Trackwork   
Traditional 
Lump Sum 
New Build 
Western 
Australia 
2,501,453 3,341,107 839,653 25.13 839,653 
Urban Light Rail 
Design and 
Construct 
New Build 
New South 
Wales 
81,519,436 106,472,525 24,953,089 23.44 24,953,089 
New Signals 
Traditional 
Lump Sum 
Up-grade 
South 
Australia 
8,942,956 9,761,790 81,8834 8.39 81,8834 
Urban Rail Revitalization - 
Electrification 
Design and 
Construct 
Electrification 
South 
Australia 
15,037,635 17,333,340 2,295,705 13.24 2,295,705 
Regional Rail ( Includes new track and 
station, bridge refurbishment) 
Alliance 
Contract 
New Build and 
Upgrade 
Victoria 
318,307,311 353,376,242 35,068,931 9.92 35,068,931 
Urban Rail (Track Extension) 
 
Traditional 
Lump Sum 
New Build 
Western 
Australia 
23,959,264 25,385,033 1,425,769 5.62 1,027,891 
Freight Track 
 
Traditional 
Cost-Plus 
New Build 
Western 
Australia 
12,748,006 28,369,461 15,621,455 55.06 15,621,455 
Urban Track Upgrade  
Traditional 
Lump Sum 
New Build and 
Upgrade 
Western 
Australia 
29,914,480 31,352,254 1,437,774 4.59 1,437,774 
Iron Ore Track Extension (Spur Line) 
Traditional 
Cost-Plus 
New Build and 
Upgrade 
Western 
Australia 
1,851,459 6,867,640 5,016,181 73.04 5,016,181 
Iron Ore New Build 
Traditional 
Cost-Plus 
New Build 
 
Western 
Australia 
1,200,000 36,691,197 35,491,197 96.73 35,491,197 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for cost change 
 
Statistic 
Value 
(%) 
 
 
Range 100.92 
Mean 23.00 
Variance 793.15 
Std. Deviation 28.16 
Coef. of Variation 1.22 
Std.Error 7.04 
Skewness 1.70 
Excess Kurtosis 2.33 
Min -4.19  
5% -4.19  
10% -2.52  
25% (Quartile 1) 6.01  
50% (Median) 12.3  
75% (Quartile 3) 25.11  
90% 80.14  
95% 96.73  
Max 96.73  
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Table 3. Goodness of Fit Tests 
Distribution Type Sig. 
α Level 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (D) 
Critical Value 
Anderson 
Darling (A2) 
Critical Value 
Chi-squared 
(χ2) 
Critical Value 
Frechet 3P 
(Rail Projects)  
0.2 0.25778 1.3749 1.6424 
0.1 0.29472 1.9286 2.7055 
0.05 0.32733 2.5018 3.8415 
0.02 0.36571 3.2892 5.4119 
0.01 0.39201 3.9074 6.6349 
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Table 4. Examples of probabilities of cost changes  
Probability Cost 
Change 
P(X < X1) P(X > X1) P(X1< X < X2) P(X < X2) P(X >X2) 
1 and 5% 
 
0.13 0.87 0.12 0.25 0.75 
6 and 10% 
 
0.28 0.72 0.12 0.40 0.60 
11 and 15% 
 
0.43 0.57 0.09 0.53 0.47 
16 and 20% 
 
055 0.45 0.08 0.62 0.38 
21 and 25% 
 
0.64 0.36 0.06 0.70 0.30 
26 and 30% 
 
0.71 0.29 0.04 0.75 0.25 
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Figure 2. Scatterplot of rail projects 
  
Traditional Cost Plus and located in 
Western Australia 
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Figure 2. Frechet 3P: PDF for cost change 
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Figure 3. Frechet 3P: CDF for cost change 
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Figure 4. PDF with delimiters between 15% and 25% cost change 
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Adapted from: Department of Transport and Main Roads (2015:p.4) 
Figure 5. The ideal cost scenario 
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Adapted from: Department of Transport and Main Roads (2015:p.5) 
Figure 6. An acceptable cost scenario 
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Adapted from: Department of Transport and Main Roads (2015:p.5) 
Figure 7. Unacceptable cost scenario 
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Figure 8. Extracts from a Building Information Model for a rail project 
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Figure 9. Creation of a Systems Information Model for a rail project  
